Art in Fairfield Harbour
New member
Question: Was the merchant vessel on autopilot? AIS seems to say so. Did merchant vessel have a radar / visual watch? Who was on the bridge - anyone?
Art in Fairfield Harbour":309gbrlm said:Question: Was the merchant vessel on autopilot? AIS seems to say so. Did merchant vessel have a radar / visual watch? Who was on the bridge - anyone?
thataway":3mf8rv0i said:I cannot read the article (I have "exceeded my free monthly limit for the New York Times".
I wonder how much "over scheduled" the sailors, Marines and Army grunts were during WW I I ?
You join the military, it is a commitment. I don't know the Navy Watch, schedule, but in our boats with two aboard, it is 3 hours on watch and 3 off watch. (Sometimes you don't get to sleep on that "off". In very crowded lanes--Panama Canal entrances, English Channel, Cape Finestere, Straits of Messina we dealt with very crowded waterways at night. You have to be constantly watching the lights and radar. No question it is fatiguing and stressful. But there are a number of people on watch on the Navy ships--to be sure that these type of mistakes are not made.
RobLL.[/quote said:ps - to exceed limits on articles per time period switch it to 'private window'. They keep track by means of cookies stored on your computer. Private window erases those cookies, but only ones opened during the session.
that away":x3rpnt4b said:SNIP
Needless to say, during my medical training we had many months where the duty was 36 on and 12 off (if you were lucky). On DeBakey's service, the Chief resident was on for the entire month. There would be many nights when you were lucky to get a couple of hours sleep. There are some who cannot acclimate to that type of schedule. There are others who only seem to require 3 hours of sleep at night (including Dr. Debakey). I have known a number of very competent people who do very well with short sleep periods.
SNIP
Foggy":2uqvqamd said:Not so sure I'd pound my chest about rendering medical care on lack of sleep and
think it results in quality care for the patient. The US falls way behind others in
actually delivering care to our countrymen/women/children, especially the
underprivileged, realizing other factors at work here in addition to the tired and
overworked.
An 11-country survey finds that adults in the United States are far more likely than those in other countries to go without needed care because of costs and to struggle to afford basic necessities such as housing and healthy food. U.S. adults are also more likely to report having poor health and emotional distress. Bright spots for the U.S. include rates of timely access to specialist care, discussion with a physician about ways to lead a healthy life, and coordinated hospital discharge planning.
Causes of collisions
During the age of steam, but before the introduction of radar for commercial shipping, insufficient lookouts as well as lack of uniform collision prevention rules could be considered the main cause. Once the radar was introduced, and as ships’ speed increased, improper radar plotting, wrong evaluation of the radar observations, combined with insufficient or complete lack of lookouts, caused collisions.
And today, in an age of highly sophisticated electronic navigational aids, where do we look when examining the multi-faceted possible causes of collisions?
Various publications exist on the subject of proper watch-keeping and collision avoidance. Nevertheless, the same errors and mistakes occur, again, and again. To be fair, one has to make distinctions when looking at the causes of collisions.
Manning
. Ship managers apply for the lowest possible number of crew and flag states are often too lenient and accept managers’ statements, neglecting the requirements for qualification and training of those assigned for watch-keeping duties. As a result, we have chronically under-manned ships, especially in the short-sea trade. This in turn causes a dilemma for the master, who is required to maintain safe navigational watches on board his ship.
How can the master of a ship comply with the necessity of posting a lookout during every watch, if the ship’s complement is reduced to the lowest legal limit?
Long hours
Watch-keeping periods of nine hours and longer in coastal waters are not uncommon in the short-sea container trade. Surveys have shown that the attention of the officer of the watch declines rapidly towards the end of a normal watch of four hours.2 So, how can an officer of the watch be vigilant after eight or nine hours, adding that during the last two hours’ sailing upriver dense fog prevailed and the officer had to take care of the VHF traffic for shore radar guidance? Failure will be guaranteed under such circumstances.
Short-sea navigation in confined waters, in adverse weather conditions and dense traffic, with an officer of the watch suffering from fatigue, with no assistance of a lookout, creates the perfect condition for a collision.
Bridge team management
If the different responsibilities are not clearly allocated, members of the bridge team may not take the required action to avoid a collision. The officer of the watch, especially if he has little experience, may assume that the master’s appearance on the bridge automatically passes the responsibility to the master, when in reality the latter only wants to supervise his new officer. If a dangerous situation arises then, perhaps none of the two will take the necessary steps to avoid a collision. The same may occur if the master and the officer of the watch rely on the pilot, without careful observation and evaluation of the pilot’s manoeuvres. The time a pilot boards a ship is not a time for rest – it is a time for increased awareness and vigilance, because pilots may not be fully aware of the manoeuvring characteristics of the ship just boarded.
Paperwork
A lookout is required not only during periods of darkness or reduced visibility, but also during daylight. During night watch, as long as normal visibility prevails, the navigational lights can be made out easily, provided the officer of the watch and the lookout keep a proper watch. Additionally, a proper watch on the radar will assist and alert the officer of the watch in time. During daytime officers of the watch are too often distracted by paperwork, a result of the increasing bureaucracy imposed upon seafarers by various international and national legal requirements.
Proper lookout
Statistics show that the most common causes of collisions are lack of awareness combined with poor watch-keeping practices, i.e., the lack of a proper lookout.
Lack of awareness arises often out of insufficient evaluation of information provided by electronic navigational aids as a result of insufficient qualification and training of those who are assigned as watch-keepers. Complacency adds to it and professional mistakes are the result.
Sterile conditions
An officer keeping the watch in rough weather in a warm, enclosed wheelhouse, sitting in a comfortable armchair in front of his navigation panel, with no or hardly any possibility of opening windows or walking out into the fresh air in the bridge wings will soon fall asleep, especially if his watch-keeping and working hours are excessive. There will be nobody to talk to during his watch if no lookout is posted. Even if a lookout is there, communication may often be difficult despite the requirement of the ISM Code for a common working language – are they proficient enough in the common working language to communicate with each other also on subjects not related to work?
Fatigue and social isolation on board ships with reduced crews combined with lack of motivation
In such “sterile conditions prevailing on many ships, with crews of mixed nationalities often existing in a system of voluntary apartheid”5 it is no wonder that there are other thoughts in the mind of the officer of the watch than the on-coming vessel steering on a course which cries for disaster. If his attention is re-focused, it is often too late for proper evaluation of the electronic navigation instruments. The consequence is a false perception of the other ship’s speed and course and of his own ship’s position.