USS Fitzgerald

ssobol":hod5sgk4 said:
I was recently on the USS Wisconsin (now a museum ship, but last used in the
Gulf War). As part of a tour we were taken to the bridge. It as pointed out the there were no controls there for driving the ship, only a number of displays showing the state of things (prop RPMs, course, rudder angle, etc.). Any changes to the speed or direction of the ship had to be given as orders to be carried out by people elsewhere. Apparently there would be a fair number of people hanging about to relay these orders.

So not only was there no direct control of the ship from the bridge, there was also the possibility of miscommunicating the actual order in all the relays.

Seems like a poor way to drive something like a big ship.
Click to expand...

Although this was true of the battleships of WWII (she was commissioned in 1944 and one of the last battleships built), it is not true of modern ships like the Fitzgerald and the McCain. These ships have computerized direct control, as RobLL noted. More recently I have read both personal and public posts of a friend of mine who is an Annapolis graduate and commanded ships of this size and in these exact waters, during his career--and more recently had the conn of ships of the same types as the Fitzgerald and McCain, during testing of systems. The comments were lengthy, but basically boiled down to the something akin to cmetzenberg noted. The officers on the bridge often have as few as 400 hours of sea time on the bridge. In the merchant marine, a new 2nd mate is required to have 2800 hours of sea time on the bridge.

It appears that even the "brief loss of steering" on the McCain, was actually due to operator error--flipping the wrong switch transferring the helm to the aft station. The command on the bridge did not recognize that this had happened for 3 minutes! In summary there were poorly trained individuals with less than optimal experience on the bridge, who had poor situational awareness.

There is another more lengthy report of 173 pages. This apparently looks at the incident more from a training aspect, and it appears that the training of watch keepers only covers half of the required material, plus being deficient in time on watch.
 
Bob,
Thanks for posting the links...
Re Fitzgerald, I would have thought it impossible for the crew to not comply with the Rules, not comply with the sep scheme, not to have near-constant VHF comm with all possible targets, not use AIS when it's available, not have better crew teamwork, and not know how to trim the radar (I'll take AIS any day over radar for now, as I have little experience with the latter and the AIS is virtually idiot-proof).
In both cases, the CO commanded lighting the 'red over red' 'vessel not under command' when things were going to hell, RATHER THAN VHF radio calls which ONE WOULD SUSPECT would get the attention of surrounding threats A LOT sooner.

I'm flaggergasted, and yet my natural inclination is to assume that any military crew has the best training, are the best volunteer people, and have the best ships and airframes to work with in the entire world.

Re McCain, it seems hard to fathom that the one person on the bridge who had been handed off responsibility for engine control failed to comphemend that props were not synched, and his (or her) singular failure could not be seen or corrected by anyone else on the bridge for so long as to be the major reason for the collision.

I have seen a lot of military mishap reports.
One thing that is common to all of them, is that you will NEVER, EVER FIND IS THIS:
"The (name branch of Military) advised the Congress that there was good reason to include funding for the (system that would have prevented the mishap), however Congress declined to fund that."

Our sympathies and prayers are with the families of the lost sailors, mostly 21-28 years old.

We all know we live in a vibrant, complex and wonderful society. We wouldn't want it any other way.
We hope the Navy gets some 'lessons learned' and imparts it among all aboard.
John
 
Just finally read through a 72 page report of the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions. Wow. I can sort of understand how the McCain incident happened. In the world of Aviation, we say Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, all in that order. These sailors had a flustered moment when they thought they lost steering control, and lost situational awareness in the process. This shit happens. Something gets mis-communicated or you're caught off guard by an equipment malfunction or glitch, even if it's human caused. At that time the right thing to do might have been to get on the horn with ships around you, put out a securite call, and just come to all stop. But again, in this situation, bad stuff happens....Learn from it and retrain! (And yes, fatigue is a factor...)

Now, regarding the Fitzgerald, why do I think this crew might have had some issues working together? Or were a bunch of cowboys out for a fast ride? The OOD seemed confused on what to do when it was apparent they were in an extreme situation. And others around him were not speaking up, or when they did, were ignored or countered, incorrectly. Basic seamanship was non-existent. Running fast without regard to known shipping lanes. Cutting in front of other ships in the dark. Pretending to be the stand on boat when you are the one to give way. Etc. Basically not unlike some of those "boaters" we see way to frequently that we'd all like to see stay off the water. Just makes me very sad to think that these Navy officers had no idea how to operate a ship on shared waters. Nor perhaps was there much respect between them and their crew.

Colby
 
Not really a back in the olden days were better comment.

Ending the draft resulted in some unintended consequences for the navy. One way to avoid the draft was to join the navy. We had a lot of short timers (as compared to lifers), I was such. We may have not intended to be in the navy that long, but most of us, enlisted and officers, did the best job we could, and had a good attitude and were dedicated mariners - even if planning to quit as soon as our terms were up.

Perhaps the most crucial group in the navy are enlisted men (and now women) in their second and third enlistments. They really do the work in running the ship. The navy has for decades been short of this group - it was short of them in the 70s and likely is even shorter of them now. That is how I read the reports.
 
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-nav ... at-hit-it/

This is one of two or three new stories from the Navy Times.

Even more dismaying than what we have posted earlier. In my time in many years ago our ships were crewed by anti-war, short timers, as well as other sorts. But the degree of professionalism by all hands was exemplary.

ps - particularly read this article.

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-nav ... -save-her/
Mission overruled overruled non-preparedness. This flows up to the Pentagon, the Administration, and to Congress
 
Geeze! Are we talking about the US Navy here or McCales Navy? Although the second one would have been much more seasoned and experienced...
 
In reading the several links that RobLL posted, it becomes clear that both the Fitzgerald and McCain tragedy's had a number of common links--including lack of training of the crews (which goes to errors at upper echelon of command), but also both had poorly operating CIC (Combat Information center or "War Rooms") which failed to provide the redundancy of back up Radar and AIS.

I quote one source:
In peacetime CIC acts as the electronic " eyes and ears" of the ship, advising the bridge team as far as how to navigate and maneuver safely and serving as a backup to make sure everything is being done safely.
Click to expand...
 
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