USS Fitzgerald

There is a possibility that the merchant ship was originally in an overtaking situation, and switched it to a crossing situation mid-maneuver.
 
Thank you for sharing.

I personally find the starboard overtaking versus crossing situation to be confusing at times, especially at night. While 22.5 degrees may be a nice number, I find it difficult sometimes to tell ii a 'boat' in the 22.5 degree arc/region is crossing my bow or overtaking me. In my case I always give way because the ultimate rule is to avoid collision and my boat is very small in the scheme of things. When you start talking 2.5 miles to stop a ship, and you are trying to second guess what the other ship is going to do............well good luck.
 
So what is the proper response when a bass boat comes up your port side, accelerates and cuts across your bow giving everyone on board a cold shower from his spray? Oh yes, and he waved. :roll:
 
Jake":26dr9n5n said:
So what is the proper response when a bass boat comes up your port side, accelerates and cuts across your bow giving everyone on board a cold shower from his spray? Oh yes, and he waved. :roll:

Perhaps the absence of a gene pool lifeguard may address the problem. We recently had two bass boats ignore the rules of the road and take each other out. One of the survivors is still in intensive care.
 
One question I asked a retired Navy Captain, who was involved with ship maneuvers as a consultant, was about AIS. His response is that Navy Ships do not transmit AIS signals.

I asked if they had receives,--not yet a response.

The AIS track of merchant ship is very clear on captured satellite tracks--and seems to be consistent 18.5 knots and course 068 degrees, until point of impact. No change of course--except turn to Starboard after collision.

Question if merchant ship was passing--unknown. But one would expect the Navy ship to be faster-speed at impact not know.

What about physical watch? My friend tells me over a dozen watch standers would have been on duty at the time of impact--including radar officers and at least two officers on the bridge.

I have seen Navy ships run "Dark"--only masthead blue or red lights on--no red and green or white lights. So, warships can be the exception when on maneuvers...but in this area?

Lots of questions--not many answers.
 
While I was on destroyers there were always three outside watches. Port and Starboard, and one watching aft. These in addition to all the crew in the bridge.
 
This seems to be another case where a US vessel gets into trouble in non US
waters and the public hears nada. My money says the reason for no explanation
so far is that somehow the US ship was at fault.

Aye.
Grandma used to say, "If you know you are wrong and are caught, at first say
nothing."
 
I have seen US Navy ships running with AIS on in Juan de Fuca and down into Puget Sound. That said, I have also seen US navy ships in the same waters without AIS transponders putting out positions.

I have not figured out what (or who), makes the decision for ON or OFF. :roll:

On more than several occasions, I have seen the Submarine support/escort boats (usually 3, running at about 25 to 30 knots and fairly close together, maybe a hundred yards between them going by, and the lead will have an AIS transponder on, but the other 2 will not.

Harvey
SleepyC :moon

JC_Lately_SleepyC_Flat_Blue_070.thumb.jpg
 
I finished reading the report. It is worth taking the time to do so. (I find a previous post offensive. I hope the poster withdraws it). The US Navy has a procedures to investigate, establish what happens, find mistakes, and fault, and court martial if appropriate.

The radio room was, as I read things, completely knocked out of commission. The destroyer division commander was advised of the collision thirty minutes after the collision and by personal cell phone.

As an aside, and related to that. Our new Washington State Ferry, the Chimacum has very limited cell phone service inside. I speculate that the windows have some sort of metallic coating that hinders radio signals. A crewman has mentions that this hinders important communications, even with provided hand held equipment.

My point in all of this is that cell phones may be more important for marine operations than we currently believe and are instructed.

disclosure: I served with destroyers during the Vietnam War, and was on the staff of destroyer division.
 
Rob, as a lay person it is hard for me to comprehend why a commander, asleep in his bunk, would be found culpable in an incident of this kind.
 
The commander of a ship is always responsible, and this is true for a variety of reasons. In the situation of crowded waters the commander is supposed to be called to the bridge. For some reason (lack of training?) this did not happen. In addition the starboard lookout (outside the bridge), the two radar watch people at least one on the bridge, and at least one in the combat room, did not alert the officer in command of an approaching collision.

It appears that there seems to be dereliction of duty on the part of several people who were awake. How could this happen on a well led ship? It is simply inexplicable. Anyone of several people should have prevented this collision. Those senior officers and chiefs likely will be held responsible for insufficient training and/or lack of discipline.

ps - I was not a line officer, and am speaking simply on the basis of what I was told while serving, and on what I have read about this accident.
 
Hey Gang,

There are seven officers and crewmembers listed as being at fault. Their careers are over; period. The CO will be facing a court martial and probably the XO, as well. The Department Head of CIC, the Division Officer of CIC, and the OOD will in all likelihood be facing disciplinary hearings or possibly court martials depending on findings of the investigations.

The MCPO (E-9, the senior enlisted on board) aka the Command Master Chief will in all likelihood be reduced in rank by a paygrade and or two.

I spent twenty years in the Navy, most of it at sea, and cannot recall a Commanding Officer being asleep while entering or operating in a busy sea lane or entering a port. Then again, that was over two decades ago...

Spuncopper
 
Pandion":2mvzofsu said:
Rob, as a lay person it is hard for me to comprehend why a commander, asleep in his bunk, would be found culpable in an incident of this kind.

Thanks to RobLL and Spuncopper for their prospective! I served in the Army, but there if there was any potential issue, the CO and OOD were notified immediately.

On my own, and other recreational vessels I have crewed on, the standing order was for who was on watch to call the skipper immediately, if any question or any potential danger.! At night we kept Radar on, we did visual scans of 360 degrees at least every 5 minutes--no matter what the weather.

The major question remains why the Fitzgerald did not seem to recognize the presence of the merchant ship?

I read the report, and basically the time line leaves out any information prior to the collision. I suspect that future reports may/or may not, establish the actions, if any of the Fitzgerald, prior to the collision. I think that confounds all of us, that there was no recognition on radar or visual watch.

Radio--I have experienced being in the midst of naval operations at night where no naval ship responded to my VHF "Security" calls. I called USCG on the HF SSB radio, since I was out of VHF range of shore. Very shortly after my call to the Coast Guard, the Captain of the 968' Air Craft carrier CV43 "Coral Sea", was on the VHF radio assuring me, that they were tracking our 38 foot sail boat, and there was no danger, even though the ships were running dark, except for minimal navigation lights.

RobLL's comment about using Cell Phone to contact division commander is interesting. It does appear the radio room was flooded and out of commission. Hard to believe that the bridge did not have both VHF and HF radio on the bridge or some secondary station. Even our recreational boats had two separate VHF radios, and separate antenna systems--plus 2 HF/SSB radios--again redundant. antenna systems (in case the mast was lost).

AIS No data for Fitzgerald. The Crystal had AIS on, and apparently was on a steady course, at a speed of 17 knots. Fitzgerald was reported to be at a speed of 20 knots, so Crystal would not have been "overtaking". Fitzgerald did not have AIS transmitting. Was no-one watching the receiver?--surely the Navy has plotters for AIS targets.

Adm. Bill Moran, said the report made clear that “serious mistakes were made by members of the crew.” As the shipping lanes got more crowded that night, Admiral Moran said the sailors on watch “lost situational awareness,” and by the time they realized their errors, it was too late to avoid a collision with the much larger freighter.

Fitzgerald. Commander Benson, as well as several sailors on watch that night, will face what the military calls nonjudicial punishment.

Non Judicial Punishment:

Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Non-judicial punishment or "NJP" permits commanders to administratively discipline troops without a court-martial.

It is not clear that this precludes a court marshal. (In the Army it was possible to still have a Court Martial. The captain is held responsible for the crew not recognizing the dangers and not awakening him.

One other issue I found interesting that there was no "dive team" or equipment on board the Fitzgerald. It is not clear that a rescue dive team could have gotten trapped sailors out of the berthing compartment. On our recreational cruising boats we carried both SCUBA tanks and Hookah dive system. Hookah only uses a single air hose, and safety line and avoids the bulk of the tanks, and BC. A number of times we have had to dive on the bottom of the boat to clear a prop, remove debris from an water intake, or inspect for damage while at sea. I was told in the 1990's that the Canadian Coast Guard dive teams were not allowed to go into a capsized vessel's flooded compartments to free trapped occupants--because of the risk to the diver. I don't know if this is still the policy, or would be Navy policy.

Such a tragedy.
 
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